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Abstract— In the coming years, usage of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) is expected to grow tremendously. Maintain-
ing security of UAVs under cyber attacks is an important
yet challenging task, as these attacks are often erratic and
difficult to predict. Secure estimation problems study how to
estimate the states of a dynamical system from a set of noisy
and maliciously corrupted sensor measurements. The fewer
assumptions that an estimator makes about the attacker, the
larger the set of attacks it can protect the system against. In
this paper, we focus on sensor attacks on UAVs and attempt
to design a secure estimator for linear time-invariant systems
based on as few assumptions about the attackers as possible.
We propose a computationally efficient estimator that protects
the system against arbitrary and unbounded attacks, where the
set of attacked sensors can also change over time. In addition,
we propose to combine our secure estimator with a Kalman
Filter for improved practical performance and demonstrate its
effectiveness through simulations of two scenarios where an
UAV is under adversarial cyber attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The already widespread use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) is expected to continue to grow at a tremendous rate
over the next few years [1]. Civilian applications of UAVs,
such as cargo delivery [2], [3], infrastructure surveillance [4],
and agricultural applications [5], can provide great benefits
to society.
However, UAVs may be vulnerable to a variety of cyber
attacks. For example, to manage the increased UAV traffic,
each UAV may periodically send its position measurements
wirelessly to a remote traffic management center. Similarly,
two UAVs may exchange position and velocity information
in a collaborative collision avoidance procedure. These com-
munication links could be subject to Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attacks in which a malicious agent spoofs the
information being sent and/or received. Successful attacks
can lead to collisions of vehicles, economic loss and bodily
damage. Therefore, maintaining the security of UAVs under
such cyber attacks is an important but also challenging task,
as attacks are often erratic and difficult to model.
Secure estimation problems study how to estimate the
states of a dynamical system from a set of noisy and ma-
liciously corrupted sensor measurements. In designing such
estimators, it is desirable to make as few assumptions about
the attackers as possible. This is because it is very difficult,
if not impossible, to predict the behavior of attackers, and
when an attack signal violates the assumptions of a secure
estimator, then this estimator would fail to detect the attack.
Researchers have studied various approaches to securing
general cyber-physical systems, each based on a different set
of assumptions about the attacker. For example, the authors
in [6], [7] assume that the attack signal would follow certain
probabilistic distributions and then design filters for detection
of such attacks. In [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], the authors use
the game theory framework, where the controller and attacker
are players with competing goals in a game. Attackers are
assumed to adopt specific strategies that maximize a certain
cost and the controller or estimator is designed to minimize
such a cost. More recently, Fawzi et al. proposed in [13]
a secure estimation method for arbitrary attacks, with a
limiting assumption that the set of attacked sensors do not
change with time.
In this paper, we focus on sensor attacks on UAVs and
attempt to design a secure estimator for linear time-invariant
(LTI) systems based on as few assumptions about the attack-
ers as possible. First, we do not assume that the attack signals
follow any stochastic distributions, and thus our proposed
estimator works for arbitrary and unbounded attacks. Second,
we allow the set of attacked sensors to change over time. The
only assumption we make is that the number of attacked
sensors is sparse.
We formulate this secure estimation problem into the
classical error correction problem, from which we propose
an l1-optimization based estimator that is computationally
efficient. In addition, we prove the maximum number of
sensor attacks that can be corrected with our estimator and
propose a practical method for estimator design that guar-
antees accurate decoding. Finally, to improve the estimator’s
practical performance, we propose to combine our secure
estimator with a Kalman Filter (KF), and demonstrate its
effectiveness using two examples of UAVs under adversarial
cyber attacks.
II. CLASSICAL ERROR CORRECTION: A REVIEW
A. Compressed Sensing
Sparse solutions x ∈ Rn, are sought to the following
problem:
min
x
‖x‖0 subject to b = Ax (1)
where b ∈ Rm are the measurements, and A ∈ Rm×n (m
n) is a sensing matrix. ‖x‖0 denotes the number of nonzero
elements of x. The following lemma provides a sufficient
condition for a unique solution to (1).
Lemma 1: ([14]) If the sparsest solution to (1) has
‖x‖0 = q and m ≥ 2q and all subsets of 2q columns of
A are full rank, then the solution is unique.
Proof: Suppose the solution is not unique. Therefore,
there exists x1 6= x2 such that Ax1 = b and Ax2 = b
where ‖x1‖0 = ‖x2‖0 = q. Then, A(x1 − x2) = 0 and
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
04
17
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
3 J
un
 20
16
x1 − x2 6= 0. Since ‖x1 − x2‖0 ≤ 2q and all 2q columns of
A are full rank (i.e., linearly independent), it is impossible
to have x1 − x2 6= 0 that satisfies A(x1 − x2) = 0. This
contradicts the assumption.
B. The Error Correction Problem [14]
Consider the classical error correction problem: y =
Cx + e where C ∈ Rl×n is a coding matrix (l > n)
and assumed to be full rank. We wish to recover the input
vector x ∈ Rn from corrupted measurements y. Here, e is an
arbitrary and unknown sparse error vector. To reconstruct x,
note that it is obviously sufficient to reconstruct the vector
e since knowledge of Cx + e together with e gives Cx,
and consequently x since C has full rank [14]. In [14], the
authors construct a matrix F which annihilates C on the left,
i.e., FCx = 0 for all x. Then, they apply F to the output y
and obtain
y˜ = F (Cx+ e) = Fe. (2)
Thus, the decoding problem can be reduced to that of
reconstructing a sparse vector e from the observations y˜ =
Fe. Therefore, by Lemma 1, if all subsets of 2q columns
of F are full rank, then we can reconstruct any e such that
‖e‖0 ≤ q.
III. SECURE ESTIMATION
A. Problem Formulation
Consider the LTI system as follows:
x(k + 1) = Aox(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + e(k),
(3)
where x(k) ∈ Rn, y(k) ∈ Rp and u(k) ∈ Rm are the
states, measurements and control inputs at time step k.
e(k) ∈ Rp represents the attack signal at time k. Our goal
is to reconstruct the initial state x(0) of the plant from the
corrupted observations y(k)’s where k = 0, ..., T − 1.
The attack vector e(k) is such that if the ith sensor is
attacked at time k, then ei(k), the ith element of e(k) is
nonzero, otherwise ei(k) = 0. We assume that the attack
signal can be arbitrary and unbounded. In addition, we
assume that the set of attacked sensors can change over time.
As illustrated by the following example, if 2 sensors are
attacked at each time step, we can have sensors 1 and 3
attacked at time step 0, sensors 2 and 3 attacked at time 1,
and so on:
[
e(0) | e(1) | ... ] =

∗ 0 ∗ · · ·
0 ∗ 0 · · ·
∗ ∗ 0 · · ·
0 0 ∗ · · ·
 ,
where ∗ denotes a nonzero component (i.e., an attack or
corruption).
Furthermore, assume that a local control loop implements
secure state feedback and is not subject to attack: u(k) =
Gx(k). In the case of UAVs, this corresponds to using
measurements from onboard, hardwired sensors such as In-
ertial Measurement Units (IMU) for autopilot and trajectory
following. The resulting closed loop system is:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + e(k),
(4)
where the closed loop system matrix A = Ao +BG.
Finally, we define the number of correctable attacks/errors
as follows:
Definition 1: When the set of attacked sensors/nodes can
change over time, q errors are correctable after T steps by
the estimator/decoder D : (Rp)T → Rn if for any x(0) ∈ Rn
and any sequence of vectors e(0), ..., e(T − 1) in Rp such
that |supp(e(k))| ≤ q, we have D(y(0), ..., y(T−1)) = x(0)
where y(k) = CAkx(0) + e(k) for k = 0, ..., T − 1.
B. Methodology
Let Eq,T denote the set of error vectors[
e(0); ... ; e(T − 1)] ∈ Rp·T where each e(k) satisfies
‖e(k)‖0 ≤ q ≤ p.
Y ,

y(0)
y(1)
...
y(T − 1)
 =

Cx(0) + e(0)
CAx(0) + e(1)
...
CAT−1x(0) + e(T − 1)

=

C
CA
...
CAT−1
x(0) + Eq,T , Φx(0) + Eq,T
(5)
where Y ∈ Rp·T is a collection of corrupted measure-
ments over T time steps and Φ ∈ Rp·T×n represents
an observability-like matrix of the system. Here, we need
to assume that rank(Φ) = n; otherwise, the system is
unobservable and we cannot determine x(0) even if there
is no attack (i.e., Eq,T = 0).
Inspired by the error correction techniques proposed in
[14] and [15], we first determine the error vector Eq,T , and
then solve for x(0). Consider the QR decomposition of Φ ∈
Rp·T×n,
Φ =
[
Q1 Q2
] [R1
0
]
= Q1R1 (6)
where
[
Q1 Q2
] ∈ Rp·T×p·T is orthogonal, Q1 ∈
Rp·T×n, Q2 ∈ Rp·T×(p·T−n), and R1 ∈ Rn×n is a rank-n
upper triangular matrix. Pre-multiplying (5) by
[
Q1 Q2
]>
gives: [
Q>1
Q>2
]
Y =
[
R1
0
]
x(0) +
[
Q>1
Q>2
]
Eq,T . (7)
We can compute Eq,T by using the second block row:
Y˜ , Q>2 Y = Q>2 Eq,T (8)
where Q>2 ∈ R(p·T−n)×p·T . From Lemma 1, (8) has a
unique, s-sparse solution (where s ≤ q · T ) if all subsets
of 2s columns (at most 2q ·T columns) of Q>2 are full rank.
Clearly, this is a reasonable assumption if (p·T−n) ≥ 2q ·T .
Therefore, we consider solving the following l1-minimization
problem:
Eˆq,T = arg min
E
‖E‖l1 s.t. Y˜ = Q>2 E (9)
Now, given the vector Eˆq,T , we can compute x(0) from the
first block row of (7) as follows:
x(0) = R−11 Q
>
1 (Y − Eˆq,T ) (10)
The following lemma provides the conditions under which
the solution to (10) exists and is unique.
Lemma 2: x(0) is the unique solution if |supp(Φz)| >
2s = 2(q · T ) for all z ∈ Rn\{0}.
Proof: We first prove the claim C1: if |supp(Φz)| >
2s = 2(q · T ) for all z ∈ Rn\{0} then all subsets of 2s
columns of Q>2 are full rank. Then by Lemma 1 and noting
that by definition the null space of Q>2 equals the column
space of Φ, we have x(0) is the unique solution.
Proof of C1 by contradiction: Suppose there exist 2s
columns of Q>2 that are linearly dependent. Then, there exists
E0 6= 0 such that Q>2 E0 = 0 where |supp(E0)| ≤ 2s. Since
the null space of Q>2 equals the column space of Φ, there
exists z such that E0 = Φz (i.e., E0 is in the column space of
Φ). Then, |supp(Φz)| = |supp(E0)| ≤ 2s (contradiction).
The sufficient condition, provided in Lemma 2, for the
existence of a unique solution to (10) is hard to check as it
requires satisfiability of the condition for all z ∈ Rn\{0}. In
the following Theorem, we prove an equivalent, yet simple-
to-check, sufficient condition that only needs to be verified
for the eigenvectors of A.
Theorem 1: Let A ∈ Rn×n, C ∈ Rp×n. Assume that C
is full rank, (A,C) is observable and A has n distinct positive
eigenvalues such that 0 < λ1 < λ2 < · · · < λn. Define:
• si , |supp(Cvi)|, where vi is an eigenvector of A,
• S , {s1, s2, · · · , sn},
• For every m ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let Sm be any subset of S
with m elements, define TSm ,
(m−2)·p+minSm
maxSm−2q . Then
Tm is such that Tm > TSm for all subsets Sm, i.e. all
subsets of m elements from the set S.
Choose T such that T ≥ max{T2, · · · , Tn}. Then, the
following are equivalent:
(i) ∀vi ∈ Rn where Avi = λivi,
|supp(Cvi)| > 2q
(ii) ∀vi ∈ Rn where Avi = λivi,
|supp(Φvi)| > 2q · T
(iii) ∀z ∈ Rn\{0}, |supp(Φz)| > 2q · T
Proof: Interested readers are referred to the proof for
Theorem 1 in our archived paper [16].
Theorem 1 states that if the feedback system and the secure
estimator are designed such that all the conditions in the
theorem are satisfied, then our proposed secure estimator can
guarantee accurate correction of q errors by checking the
following very simple condition:
∀vi ∈ Rn where Avi = λivi, |supp(Cvi)| > 2q.
C. Number of Correctable Errors
Given that the set of attacked nodes can change over time
and e(k) satisfies |supp(e(k))| ≤ q for all k, we prove
in Proposition 1 (see below) that the maximum number of
correctable errors (as defined in Definition 1) by our decoder
is dp/2− 1e, where p is the number of measurements.
Proposition 1: Let A0 ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m and C ∈
Rp×n and assume that the pair (A0, B) is controllable, C
is full rank and each row of C is not identically zero. Then
there exists a finite set F ⊂ R+ such that for any choice of n
numbers λ1, · · · , λn ∈ R+\F such that 0 < λ1 < · · · < λn,
there exists G ∈ Rm×n such that:
• The eigenvalues of the closed-loop matrix A (= A0 +
BG) are λ1, · · · , λn.
• If the pair (A,C) is observable, then the number of
correctable errors for the pair (A,C) is maximal after
T = max{n, T ∗} time steps and is equal to dp/2− 1e,
where T ∗ is the value of T from Theorem 1.
Proof: The proof for Proposition 4 in [13] shows that
if the chosen poles λ1, · · · , λn are distinct, positive and do
not fall in some finite set F , then there is a choice of G
such that the eigenvalues of A (= A0 + B) are exactly
λ1, · · · , λn, and the corresponding eigenvectors vi are such
that |supp(Cvi)| = p. Thus, by Theorem 1, the number of
correctable errors for (A,C) is dp/2− 1e.
In addition, recall that Eq,T consists of the error vectors
e(0), · · · , e(T − 1) stacked vertically and our proofs for
the existence of a unique solution to (10) are independent
of how the individual error (nonzero) terms are distributed
in the vector Eq,T . Thus, we can remove the assumption:
|supp(e(k))| ≤ q for all k, and allow e(k) to appear in an
arbitrary fashion, e.g. |supp(e(0))| = 2q and |supp(e(1))| =
0, as long as
∑T−1
k=0 |supp(e(k))| ≤ q · T , then our q-error-
correcting decoder can still recover the true states. In other
words, our proposed secure estimator can protect the system
against more general attacks where the number of attacked
sensors is not necessarily less than or equal to q at every
time step.
IV. COMBINATION OF SECURE ESTIMATION AND
KALMAN FILTER
Consider the state estimation problem for the following
LTI system under attack:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + e(k) + v(k),
(11)
where x, y, u and e are as defined in (3); and v is a zero
mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian
measurement noise.
A KF can be used to estimate the states by modeling
the attack signal as noise. More specifically, define a new
measurement noise v¯(k) = e(k) + v(k) to give a new
measurement equation y(k) = Cx(k)+ v¯(k). A KF can then
estimate the states from the inputs u(k) and the corrupted
measurements y(k) [17]. One caveat with this method is that
KFs assume zero mean and i.i.d. white Gaussian measure-
ment noise, however, attack signals are usually erratic and
may be poorly modeled by Gaussian processes [17], i.e., e(k)
and consequently, v¯(k) may not be Gaussian. Take Global
Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attacks for example,
attack signals are often structured to resemble normal GPS
signals or can be genuine GPS signals captured elsewhere.
When the system is subjected to attacks that are poorly
modeled by Gaussian processes, it is reasonable to expect
KFs to fail to recover the true states.
On the other hand, our proposed secure estimator does
not assume the attack signal to follow any model, and
therefore, it works for arbitrary and unbounded attacks. The
only assumption is that the number of attacked sensors is
sparse, i.e., less than dp/2−1e. As the set of attacked sensors
becomes less sparse, our secure estimator occasionally fails
to recover the true states. Based on these observations, we
propose to combine our secure estimator with a KF to
improve its practical performance, as detailed in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 Combined secure estimator with KF
1: Initialize the KF
2: for each k do
3: if k ≥ T then
4: Estimate the attack signal at time k, eˆ(k), using
secure estimator
5: else
6: Set eˆ(k) = 0
7: end if
8: Form a new measurement equation: y˜(k) = Cx(k)+
v˜(k), where y˜(k) = y(k)−eˆ(k) and v˜(k) = e(k)−eˆ(k)+
v(k)
9: Apply standard KF using u and y˜
10: end for
The intuition is that the secure estimator acts as a pre-
filter for the KF, so that v˜(k) is close to a zero mean i.i.d.
Gaussian process even when the true attack signal e(k) is not.
At most time steps k, the secure estimator perfectly recovers
e(k), i.e., eˆ(k) = eˆ(k), hence v˜(k) = v(k) and thus, is a
zero mean Gaussian process. What happens when the secure
estimator fails? (5) shows that the estimated state at time
k, xˆ(k), is independent from the estimated state at another
time step xˆ(l) (l 6= k). As a result, when the secure estimator
fails, its estimation error, e(k) − eˆ(k), appears to be quite
random. Putting these together: v˜(k) = e(k) − eˆ(k) + v(k)
is closer to a zero mean i.i.d. white Gaussian process than
v¯(k) (i.e., the corresponding measurement noise if a KF is
applied directly to estimate the states), which improves the
KF’s performance. Finally, the if statement in Algorithm 1
ensures that the secure estimator always has access to T past
measurements.
Next, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
method through simulations of a UAV under two types of
adversarial attacks, which also provides a realistic example
illustrating the behaviors described in this section.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. UAV Model
We consider a quadrotor with the following dynamics:
x(k + 1) = A0x(k) +Bu(k) + g
y(k) = Cx(k) + e(k) + v(k),
(12)
where x = [px, vx, θx, θ˙x, py, vy, θy, θ˙y, pz, vz]T is the state
vector. px, py and pz represent the quadrotor’s position
along the x, y and z axis, respectively, and vi’s are their
corresponding velocities. θx and θy are the pitch and roll
angles respectively, and θ˙i’s are their corresponding angular
velocities. The input vector u = [θr,x, θr,y, F ]T , where
θr,i is the reference pitch or roll angle, and F is the
commanded thrust in the vertical direction. y = [p˜x, p˜y, p˜z]T
represents corrupted position measurements under attack e
and measurement noise v. The constant vector g represents
gravitational effects and can be dropped without loss of
generality because we can always subtract it out in u. Further
details about this model and its derivation can be found
in [18]. Finally, the matrix C depends on the particular
measurements taken in each example.
B. Decoder Design via Pole-Placement
We assume that the UAV uses the state feedback control
law u(k) = Gx(k)1, where G is the feedback matrix which
can be designed. In this section, we show that we can
design G to achieve our desired trade-off between the control
performance and the secure estimation performance.
If the open loop pair (A0, B) is controllable, then the
closed loop poles can be placed anywhere in the complex
plane by appropriate choice of G. First, we design a Linear
Quadratic Regulator (LQR) and evaluate its secure estimation
performance: we check the number of errors that the resulting
secure estimator can correct by finding the maximum q for
which |supp(Cvi)| > q for all i. Figure 1 shows the results
for a matrix C ∈ R5×10 (i.e., 5 measurements). Observe that
|supp(Cvi)| < p = 5 for i = 1, 2, 9, 10 and furthermore,
|supp(Cvi)| = 1 > 0 for i = 9 and 10, which means that the
resulting secure decoder can correct zero errors! As shown in
Figure 1, to improve the secure estimation performance, we
perturb the closed-loop poles slightly until |supp(Cvi)| = p
for all i, i.e., we design a secure decoder that can achieve
the maximum number of correctable errors within the limits
of p (i.e., the number of measurements). By keeping the
perturbations on the poles small, our final controller achieves
both good control and estimation performances.
1In the GPS spoofing example, direct uncorrupted state measurements
are not available. Therefore a KF is used to give estimated states which are
then used for state feedback control.
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Fig. 1. |supp(Cvi)| for all eigenvectors vi of the closed-loop matrix A for
2 feedback controllers: a LQR and a controller designed by pole-placement.
Black dashed line is at p = 5, i.e., the number of measurements.
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Fig. 2. Different communication channels that are subjected to cyber
attacks.
C. UAV under Adversarial Cyber Attack
1) MITM Attack in Communication: In this section, we
consider MITM attacks targeted at Channels 1 and 2 in
Figure 2, where a malicious agent spoofs the information
being sent and/or received over these channels. The goal of
the remote control center or the other UAV is to accurately
estimate the true flight path of the target UAV from com-
promised measurements. Note that the attack does not affect
the actual path of the target UAV (as opposed to the GPS
spoofing example later in this section).
Assume that the attacker aims to deceive the receiver
that the target UAV is deviating in the x-direction, there-
fore she spoofs the x-position measurements by injecting a
continuous and increasing attack signal in px. To make the
estimation task even harder for the receiver, at each time
step, the attacker injects a Gaussian noise to an additional
randomly selected measurement, and the choice of this
measurement changes over time.
In this example, we first demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed decoder design using the pole-placement
method by comparing the estimation performance of the
decoder resulting from (1) a LQR controller and (2) a
controller designed using pole-placement as described in the
previous section. We then implement the latter controller,
and compare the performance of three different estimation
schemes: (1) KF only (KF), (2) secure estimator only (SE),
and (3) secure estimator combined with KF (KF+SE).
Throughout this example, y ∈ R5 and the measurements
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Fig. 3. Estimated attack signal, true attack signal and estimation error in
the attack signal of the estimator (SE) with 2 different feedback controllers:
LQR, controller designed via pole-placement (PP); with 5 measurements.
Left column shows estimated attack signals. Middle column shows true
attack signal. Right column shows estimation error. Each row corresponds
to one type of measurement. Red pixels indicate positive values, green pixels
are negative values and black indicates zero.
include the x, y and z positions and two additional ran-
domly selected states. Figure 3 compares the accuracy of
the estimated attack signals by the LQ regulator (top) and
the one designed via pole-placement (bottom). In each plot,
one row corresponds to one sensor, and the first 3 rows
are the x, y and z position measurements, respectively.
The color of the pixel indicates the value of the signal or
the estimation error. The middle plots show the true attack
signal and they highlights three points: first, the attacked
sensors change with time; second, the number of attacked
sensors at each time step k is less or equal to 2; third, only
position measurements are corrupted. The left plots show
the estimated attacked signal by each decoder. It is easy
to see that the decoder resulting from a feedback controller
designed via pole-placement estimates the attack signal much
more accurately. The right plots of this figure highlight this
observation by explicitly showing the estimation error of the
attack signal for each measurement.
Figure 4 compares the estimated flight paths by all three
methods: KF, SE and KF+SE. The UAV starts from the
blue triangle and follows the solid blue line to land at
the blue square. The estimated paths by each method are
shown in red dashed lines. Observe that the KF fails to
filter out the attack signal in the x-position measurements
as the attack is highly non-Gaussian, and the estimated
trajectory differs significantly from the true one. On the other
hand, SE correctly estimates most portions of the trajectory
and the final position of the vehicle, nevertheless it gives
spontaneous errors. Finally the combined method KF+SE
perfectly recovers the true path of the target UAV.
2) GPS Spoofing: In this section, we focus on adversarial
attacks in the GPS navigation system (Channel 3 in Figure 2).
Consider the scenario where a UAV uses a Linear Quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) controller to follow a desired trajectory,
xr(k). In other words, a KF uses corrupted and noisy
measurements y(k) to produce a state estimate xˆ(k), which
is then used for state feedback control: u(k) = G(xˆ(k) −
xr(k)), where G is the feedback matrix. Note that in the pre-
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Fig. 4. Estimated UAV trajectory by three methods under MITM attack: KF
only (KF), secure estimator only (SE), secure estimator with KF (KF+SE).
Solid blue lines are the true UAV trajectories. They start from the blue
triangle and end at the blue square. Red dashed lines represent estimated
trajectories by each method, with 5 measurements.
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Fig. 5. Desired and actual UAV trajectory in different cases: KF and
KF+SE, each using 3, 5 and 8 different measurements. Blue solid lines are
the desired trajectory. Red dash lines are the actual UAV trajectory under
adversarial attack.
vious example (Section V-C.1), the feedback controller had
access to uncompromised state measurements x(k), therefore
the true trajectory of the UAV is unaffected by attacks. In
this example, however, the UAV uses estimated states xˆ(k)
for feedback control and path following. Therefore, if the
measurements are corrupted and the state estimates are poor,
then the UAV may deviate away from its desired path. Hence,
the goal of the UAV is to accurately follow its planned
trajectory in the presence of cyber attacks.
Assume an attacker spoofs the GPS position measurements
in order to deviate the UAV from its desired path. She
injects a sinusoidal signal into the x position measurement,
as well as a Gaussian noise to a randomly chosen position
measurement at each time step.
In this example, we explore the effect of the number of
sensor measurements on the secure estimation performance
of two schemes: (a) KF only, (b) KF+SE. First, we assume
that the UAV only uses GPS for navigation, i.e., 3 positional
measurements. Figure 5 shows that KF completely fails to
estimate the attack signal (KF, ny = 3), consequently, the
actual UAV trajectory (red dashed line) deviates significantly
from its desired path (solid blue line). On the other hand,
the combined method KF+SE’s estimated attack signals are
significantly more accurate, therefore the UAV can follow its
planned path much more closely (Figures 5, KF + SE, ny =
3). Recall from Proposition 1 that the maximum number
of correctable errors for a system with p measurements is
dp/2 − 1e, which equals 1 in this case. However, at any
time step k, there are at most 2 attacked sensors, which
exceeds the above limit and explains the estimation error of
the combined method KF+SE. Despite this small estimation
error, KF+SE still outperforms the KF.
Next, we show the effect of increasing the number of
measurements (ny , or equivalently p) on the estimation
performance and consequently, the UAV’s path following
performance. This can be achieved through sensor fusion.
For example, autonomous UAVs often use IMUs in addition
to GPS for navigation, the former provides additional mea-
surements such as the UAV’s velocities, pitch and roll angles.
Figure 5 shows that increasing the number of measurements
has no effect on the KF’s estimation accuracy and hence,
its path following ability. Even when 8 measurements are
used the UAV equipped with a KF still fails to follow the
desired trajectory. On the other hand, increasing the number
of measurements improves the estimation performance of the
secure estimator SE and consequently the performance of the
combined scheme KF+SE. Figure 5 shows that when 5 and
8 measurements are used, the UAV can follow its original
planned path perfectly (KF + SE ny = 5 and KF + SE
ny = 8).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the estimation problem for
UAVs under adversarial cyber attack and propose a secure
estimation based KF that is computationally efficient and
makes no assumptions about the attack signal model. We
demonstrate that our proposed secure estimator outperforms
standard KF, using numerical examples of UAVs under
adversarial cyber attacks. This is important not only for
today’s aviation system but also delivery systems with drones
in the near future.
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